Dennett (1996) in his pioneering work suggested that the membership in the class of things that have minds has serious moral consequences. To cut off a piece of wood of a tree or a flower nobody (themselves included) cares, and if nobody cares it doesn’t matter what happens to woods or to flowers. The dead tree or a flower, however, has a different moral value from a dead animal or a dead child, primarily, because animals and children have a mind. Even though there is a substantial disagreement among scientists about which species have what sorts of mind, we know that as we are moving from the human beings to less complicated organisms, like bacteria, the possibility to suppose that the organism has a mind (in someway like a human mind – otherwise we wouldn’t call it a mind) is diminished, and consequently killing these organisms assumed to be less immoral. Sometimes the termination of the life of a mind-haver animal is culturally accepted for some reasons (e.g. for a food) but not for other (e.g. to use the leather or the fur). Thus, the morality of the action of killing human-beings and other species varies firstly when the size of the organism diminished and secondary when the reason of killing assumed to be culturally accepted.

Aims: The aim of the study was to investigate the young children’s moral judgments in case a human being terminates, for different reasons the life of other organisms, which they differ in their size.

Methodology: Participants were 150 children, including two groups of 30 kindergarteners (M= 4 years 0 months and M= 6years 1 months respectively) 30 second graders (M= 7 years 11 months), 30 fourth graders (M=9 years 11 months) and 30 sixth graders (M=9 years 11 months) each of whom interviewed individually in one session lasting approximately 10 min. There were equal number of males and females in each age group. Participants were predominantly from middle-class backgrounds and they recruited at kindergartens and elementary schools.

The experiment consisted of a set of 24 2-3 lines scenarios that presented in a random order. Each scenario was presented in the following format: “The X (human protagonist) killed Z (other human, big / medium / small animal) because (6 different reasons: defence, need of food, avarice towards food, overestimation of the danger, accidentally, and intentionally, without any reason). How much immoral (the term bad used alternatively when it was needed) is this?” Participants answered with the help of Likert scale (1 nothing at all to 4 very immoral/very bad).

Findings: Principle components method (varimax rotation) revealed 4 factors with psychological meaning, which they explain the 60.8% of the variance. The first factor, named “killing for food and for defence” (Cronbach’s alpha = .89), loads the three items where the human protagonist killed the big, the medium and the small animal for food and three items in case of defense and two item where the human protagonist killed a human being for defense and accidentally (8 items was loaded in total). The second factor, named “killing because of the overestimation of the danger and/or accidentally” (Cronbach’s alpha = .86), loads the six items where the human protagonist killed the big, the medium and the small animal because he/she overestimated the danger and/or by accident and the item where the human protagonist killed a small animal without any reason (7 items was loaded in total). The third factor, named “killing because of the avarice towards food and/or intentionally, without any reason” (Cronbach’s alpha = .82), loads the three items where the human protagonist killed the big, the medium and the small animal because he/she wanted more food than he/she was needed to cover his/her biological needs and two items where the human protagonist killed a big and a medium animal without any reason (5 items was loaded in total). The fourth factor named “killing humans” (Cronbach’s alpha = .70), loads the three items where the human protagonist killed other humans (4 items was loaded in total). The items which were loaded in each factor were computed (Mean = 2.64, SD = .83; Mean = .2.86, SD = .74; Mean = 3.39, SD = .63; Mean = 3.61, SD = .46 for the fist, second, third and fourth factor respectively). Paired sample t-test shown significant differences between the four factors (p < .001). One-way ANOVA (independent factor the age) and depended factors the total scores of each factor shown significant differences (p < .001) with the age in the three (1^st, 2^nd and 4^th factor) of the four factors. Post-hoc comparisons (LSD criterion) shown that the significant differences appeared between the kindergarteners and the primary school children. In general, the kindergarteners assume all conditions of killing as immoral/bad while the 8-year-old schoolchildren begun to assume less immoral/bad the condition where the humans killed animals for culturally accepted reasons (food, defence, overestimation of the danger and accidentally). However, when o human being killed a small animal intentionally and without a reasonable cause, children judged the killing as less immoral action. This supports the Dennett’s assertion. Children, however, seemed that adopt the culturally accepted reasons for killing animals.

Theoretical and educational significance of the research: This research has demonstrable impact to the moral education of children, as it reveals a developmental pattern of the children’s moral judgments about the termination of the life of various species including humans. While kindergarteners assumed that killing s a very immoral/bad action, school children assumed that killing is not very bad if there is a culturally accepted reason.

Dennett, D. (1996). Kinds of minds: Toward an understanding of consciousness. New York (NY): Basic Books.